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“I Got the Shotgun, You Got the Briefcase”:
Criminal Defense Ethics in The Wire
Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel†
INTRODUCTION
The Wire portrays criminal defense attorney Maury Levy as uneth-
ical and unscrupulous, the paradigmatic hired gun. In a key scene, the
honorable anti-hero Omar Little draws a stark parallel between Levy
and those who deal and steal drugs:
Levy: “You are amoral, are you not? You’re feeding off the vio-
lence and the despair of the drug trade. You’re stealing from
those who themselves are stealing the lifeblood from our city.
You are a parasite who leaches off . . .”
Omar: “Just like you”
Levy: “. . . the culture of drugs. Excuse me? What?”
Omar: “I got the shotgun, you got the briefcase. It’s all in the
Game though, right?”1
Levy is ethically complicated. At one level, he engages in extremely
effective and zealous lawyering; at another level he abdicates his ethical
duties. Over the course of the series, Levy represents two major street
gangs, the Barksdale drug organization and the Stanfield drug organi-
zation. When Levy represents people at the top of a drug organization,
he adheres to the criminal defense lawyer’s central ethical duty: he pro-
vides his clients with zealous representation and argues passionately
† Alison Siegler is a Clinical Professor of Law and Erica Zunkel is an Associate Clinical Pro-
fessor of Law at The University of Chicago Law School; they also run the law school's Federal
Criminal Justice Clinic. Many thanks to Blake Eaton for unparalleled research assistance and to
Jame DuBray for his invaluable advice.
1 The Wire: All Prologue (HBO television broadcast July 6, 2003) (Season Two, Episode Six).
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on their behalf. However, Levy deviates from the duty of zealous repre-
sentation when he represents rank-and-file members of the gang whose
interests diverge from those of the organization’s leaders.
When representing rank-and-file members, Levy not only violates
his duty of zealousness but also violates a related ethical duty: the duty
of loyalty. When a lawyer represents all of the members of a criminal
organization, an inherent conflict of interest arises under the ethical
rules because different clients often have divergent objectives.2 Levy’s
behavior highlights this problem. Rather than zealously representing
those lower down on the organization’s ladder, Levy treats them as ex-
pendable pawns. He protects the larger organization that lines his pock-
ets by sacrificing the liberty and even the lives of certain members in
the name of the larger drug organization.
The ethical problem created by multiple representations is partic-
ularly acute in Levy’s case because he affirmatively chooses to elevate
the interests of the larger drug organization and its leaders above the
interests of his other clients. The reason Levy provides legal represen-
tation to everyone in the organization is precisely because it enables
him to protect the people at the top, to sacrifice the little fish for the big
fish, and to prevent rank-and-file members from cooperating against
the larger organization.
At times, Levy crosses over the ethical line into downright criminal
behavior, aiding and abetting the illegal activities and violence of the
gang members he represents. One example of Levy crossing the line
occurs after police seize drugs and money from Levy’s clients in the
Barksdale drug organization. Levy suggests that the organization’s
leaders, Avon Barksdale and Stringer Bell, “take stock and . . . ask
yourself what’s out there that could still hurt you; where are you weak,
where you need to clean up.”3 In the process, Levy specifically mentions
Nakeesha Lyles, a security guard who previously testified against a
member of the Barksdale organization in a murder trial.4 Levy warns:
“The point is, anybody who can hurt you can be put into play. The less
I hear, the better.”5 His implication is clear: Levy wants the organiza-
tion to dispose of any potential witnesses. Heeding their lawyer’s ad-
vice, the organization’s leaders arrange for the guard’s murder.6
As the series progresses, Levy’s behavior remains unethical and his
conflicts of interest worsen. During his representation of the Marlo
2 SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
3 The Wire: Cleaning Up (HBO television broadcast Sept. 1, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Twelve).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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Stanfield organization in Season Five, Levy continues to veer from un-
ethical representation to outright criminality.7 One example of that is
when Levy is confronted by Assistant State’s Attorney Rhonda Pearl-
man with evidence that he paid court employees for confidential grand
jury information.8 Levy responds by making a deal with Pearlman that
saves him from prosecution and ensures that several members of the
Stanfield organization go to prison.9 Perhaps this devolution from un-
ethical to criminal results from the fact that there are no external con-
straints on Levy over the course of the series. Although law enforcement
reins in the criminal organizations for a time, there is often no check on
the institutional players—the police, the prosecutors, and Levy.
Levy’s highly inconsistent adherence to his ethical duties high-
lights a fundamental dichotomy in the criminal defense world: the dis-
tinction between privately retained lawyers who represent criminal or-
ganizations, and public defenders who represent individual indigent
clients. Public defenders are trained to take a client-centered approach
to achieve the best outcome for each individual client. Unlike a retained
lawyer who represents the head of a drug organization and the rank-
and-file members alike, the public defender’s loyalties are not divided.
Unfortunately, The Wire gives us only a brief glimpse into this di-
chotomy and thus misses an opportunity to paint a complex portrait of
the public defender, a major player in the urban criminal justice system
the series depicts so realistically. Instead, by focusing on Levy, the se-
ries provides a caricatured portrait of the criminal defense lawyer as
cold, self-interested, and unprincipled.
This Article progresses in four parts. Part I explores the ethical
rules that guide criminal defense lawyers, discussing the requirement
that attorneys engage in zealous advocacy for their clients, the duty of
loyalty, and the conditions under which these ethical rules operate.
Parts II and III apply these ethical rules to Levy’s representation of
members of the Barksdale and Stanfield organizations respectively,
finding that, while Levy fulfills his duty to zealously defend members
whose interests align with those of the organization, he operates under
clear conflicts of interest that lead him to sacrifice lower-ranking or dis-
loyal members. Part IV analyzes the missed opportunity for The Wire
to explore the role of the public defender in the criminal justice system
and to further highlight the stark contrast between Levy’s representa-
tion and that of other attorneys. Finally, Part V examines potential ap-
proaches that would prevent conflicts of interest like Levy’s without un-
necessarily limiting client autonomy. This Article concludes that courts
7 The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008) (Season Five, Episode Ten).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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can protect defendants from potential conflicts of interest by appointing
an independent attorney to advise the defendant when joint represen-
tation presents a high likelihood of a potential conflict. With that attor-
ney’s guidance, the defendant can decide whether waiving the conflict
is in his or her best interests.
I. CRIMINALDEFENSE ETHICS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The central ethical duty that binds Maury Levy and all lawyers is
zealous advocacy for one’s client. Specifically, “[a] lawyer must . . . act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”10 This requirement of zealous
advocacy imposes on lawyers a broad obligation to pursue their clients’
interests “despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to
the lawyer.”11 In the attorney-client relationship, the client’s interests
are paramount. Of course, this requirement is not without its limits. A
lawyer may not, for example, help a client engage in criminal conduct.12
In the criminal context, the ethical rule requiring zealous advocacy
includes a constitutional dimension. Under the Sixth Amendment,
criminal defendants are guaranteed the assistance of counsel, and the
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require the govern-
ment to provide such counsel free of charge if the defendant cannot af-
ford retained counsel.13 Without a lawyer’s assistance, “[e]ven the intel-
ligent and educated layman” “lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his [or her] defense . . . .”14 The Sixth Amend-
ment ensures that this lack of legal training will not prevent a defend-
ant from vindicating his or her rights.
It is not enough, though, for a defendant to merely have a lawyer.
Instead, “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.”15 Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s standard for effective as-
sistance of counsel, established in Strickland v. Washington,16 leaves
much unanswered in terms of the specific actions a lawyer must or must
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
11 Id.
12 Id. at r. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”).
13 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
343–45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 467–68 (1938).
14 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).
15 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
16 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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not take.17 At the very least, though, “counsel must take all reasonable
lawful means to attain the objectives of the client.”18
A. The Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty and Conflicts of Interest
In order to provide the zealous and effective representation re-
quired under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Sixth
Amendment, attorneys must maintain loyalty to their clients at all
times.19 To that end, the Model Rules state that a lawyer shall not rep-
resent a client if “the representation of one client will be directly ad-
verse to another client,” or even if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited” by the
lawyer’s representation of other clients.20 It is not enough for counsel to
be a competent and skilled lawyer in general. Instead, it is essential for
counsel to be capable of providing “undivided assistance.”21 In Glasser
v. United States,22 the Court emphasized a judge’s “duty to refrain from
embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or in-
deed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently repre-
sent interests which might diverge from those of his first client . . . .”23
At least when it comes to criminal defense, the Model Rules are
unwilling to rely on the good will of attorneys to fulfill their duty of
loyalty in the face of conflict. Indeed, the Rules specifically note that
“[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defend-
ants in a criminal case [with divergent interests] is ‘so grave’ that ordi-
narily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefend-
ant.”24 For example, codefendants may face pressure to testify against
one another in exchange for a more generous plea bargain from prose-
cutors, placing their interests in direct conflict. Even if a civil lawyer
may be able to carry out similar representation without problems, crim-
inal defense lawyers must stay especially vigilant of the potential for
conflicts of interest when representing multiple defendants in order to
avoid depriving their clients of the zealous advocacy required by the
Sixth Amendment.25
17 Id. at 688 (“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.”).
18 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
19 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“Loyalty and
independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”).
20 Id. at r. 1.7(a)(1) and (2).
21 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (emphasis added).
22 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
23 Id. at 76.
24 SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 23 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
25 See id. (noting that, while a lawyer should refuse to represent more than one codefendant
in a criminal case, “common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is
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The particular dangers of conflicts in the criminal context are also
reflected in Supreme Court precedent. As the Supreme Court recog-
nized inWood v. Georgia,26 it is especially difficult to maintain the duty
of loyalty when the operator of an alleged criminal enterprise hires and
pays a lawyer to represent his employees.27 A lawyer in that situation
must choose between the interests of the people whom he represents
and the people who pay his bills. Faced with that choice, “[o]ne risk is
that the lawyer will prevent his client from obtaining leniency by pre-
venting the client from offering testimony against his former employer
or from taking other actions contrary to the employer’s interest.”28 At
the very least, it is “inherently wrong for an attorney who represents
only the employee to accept a promise to pay from one whose criminal
liability may turn on the employee’s testimony.”29
These problems are so serious that the Court has even been willing
to relax its constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
in the conflicts context. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that
“any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the de-
fense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitu-
tion.”30 However, defendants are not required to show prejudice “when
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest”31—that is, “a con-
flict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.”32 The
Court does not require a separate investigation into whether the ad-
verse effect of counsel’s performance was severe enough to substantially
affect the defendant’s legal rights. This is because it is so difficult to
identify the exact way in which such a conflict may have hindered a
lawyer’s representation in a particular case; instead, prejudice is pre-
sumed.33 The Strickland standard, while never easy for defendants to
meet, is at least less onerous when a defendant can show an actual con-
flict.
The Supreme Court treats conflicts of interest with particular cau-
tion and skepticism. In Wood, the Court was willing to vacate the trial
court’s decision to deny the defendants’motion to modify the conditions
of their probation because the defendants’ lawyer was hired and paid
proper” in many circumstances).
26 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
27 Id. at 268–69.
28 Id. at 269.
29 Id. at 269 n.15 (quoting In re Abrams, 266 A.2d 275, 278 (N.J. 1970)).
30 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
31 Id.
32 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).
33 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345–50 (1980)).
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by their employer.34 Although the defendants could not point to a spe-
cific decision by counsel that harmed their defense, the Court demanded
that the trial court revisit the issue of counsel and take greater care to
ensure that the defendants receive truly dedicated representation.35
This stands in marked contrast to courts’ usual approach under Strick-
land, which some commentators criticize as requiring little more than
a “warm body” in the courtroom.36
As a result of the presumption of prejudice, appellate courts have
reversed convictions in cases where a defendant has shown that his or
her trial lawyer was subject to an actual conflict of interest. The Sixth
Circuit, for example, affirmed the district court’s grant of a writ of ha-
beas corpus when counsel simultaneously represented mother and
daughter codefendants in a drug case.37 In that case, police found drugs
in the home where the mother and daughter both lived.38 An uncon-
flicted lawyer representing the mother could have made the obvious ar-
gument that the drugs belonged to the daughter. While such a trial
strategy would place the daughter’s interests in jeopardy, counsel’s fail-
ure to pursue that strategy was not in the mother’s best interests.39 The
court saw no need to decide whether the alternative strategy actually
would have changed the outcome of the trial; this “evidence of disloy-
alty” alone sufficed to show that the mother had received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.40
In another case, the Eleventh Circuit found an actual conflict and
granted habeas corpus relief when an attorney represented the defend-
ant in a murder trial while also representing the murder victim’s sister
in a civil case seeking the victim’s life insurance benefits.41 The court
reversed the defendant’s conviction even though the two clients were
not involved in the same criminal case because the defendant demon-
strated an actual conflict of interest that in turn adversely affected
counsel’s representation.42 Even when conflicting representations are
34 Wood, 450 U.S. at 264–65.
35 Id. at 273–74.
36 See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1740 (1993)
(noting that public defenders sometimes refer to the Strickland test as the “warm body” test); see
also Abbe Smith, Promoting Justice Through Interdisciplinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholar-
ship: The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83,
92 (2003) (“Actually, a warm body might be benign compared to some of the dangerous, dim-witted
defenders that roam the criminal courts.”).
37 SeeMcFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2004).
38 Id. at 702–03.
39 Id. at 707.
40 Id.
41 SeeMcConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990).
42 Id. at 1549–50.
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not simultaneous, courts endeavor to protect defendants’ Sixth Amend-
ment rights. For example, the Eighth Circuit granted habeas corpus re-
lief for a defendant whose attorney had previously represented a code-
fendant who implicated the defendant at trial.43
B. Waiving Conflicts of Interest
While courts are clearly concerned with how conflicts of interest
undermine the right to effective assistance of counsel, regulation of the
attorney-client relationship also grants significant deference to clients’
decisions about their representation.44 As such, the Model Rules allow
a lawyer to represent multiple clients notwithstanding a potential con-
flict of interest as long as, among other things, “each affected client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”45
A defendant’s ability to waive potential conflicts is not unlimited,
though. Rather, a court “confronted with and alerted to possible con-
flicts of interest must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the con-
flicts warrant separate counsel.”46 In Wheat v. United States,47 mere
days before trial, defendant Wheat asked to be represented by the at-
torney for two of his coconspirators in the same drug distribution
scheme—Bravo and Gomez-Barajas—both of whom had already pled
guilty.48 The conflict was that the government intended to call Bravo to
testify against Wheat at trial.49 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s refusal to allow one attorney to represent all three coconspira-
tors under these circumstances, even though the codefendants specifi-
cally requested the joint representation and offered to waive the poten-
tial conflict.50 The Court held that, although the Sixth Amendment
establishes a presumption in favor of counsel of choice, “[f]ederal courts
43 See Dawan v. Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 1994). For a more in-depth explanation
of the test the Eighth Circuit uses to determine whether prejudice is presumed, see id. at 721 (“If
a court requires an attorney to represent two co-defendants whose interests are in conflict, the
court has violated the defendants’ right to the effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, if the trial
court either fails to make an investigation into the source of the conflict in light of a timely objec-
tion, or fails to do so when the court knows or reasonably should know that a conflict exists, rever-
sal is automatic. If a defendant has not made a timely objection to his counsel on the grounds of
conflict of interest, then he must demonstrate actual conflict and an adverse effect on the repre-
sentation.”) (citations omitted).
44 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM BAR ASS’N 2013) (granting clients the
ability to make decisions regarding the nature and objectives of representation).
45 Id. at r. 1.7(b)(4).
46 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).
47 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
48 Id. at 155.
49 Id. at 156.
50 Id. at 163–64.
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have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are con-
ducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal pro-
ceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”51 This interest requires
courts to actively investigate potential conflicts and act with substan-
tial latitude in refusing waiver.52
II. MONEY BEFORE CLIENTS: MAURY LEVY AND THE BARKSDALE
ORGANIZATION
Maury Levy’s conduct as an attorney for the Barksdale organiza-
tion starkly illustrates the ethical dangers of multiple representations.
Levy’s role as the organization’s lawyer does not just create a “signifi-
cant risk” that the representation of one client will be “materially lim-
ited” by his representation of another client.53 Rather, even when the
leaders’ interests are “directly adverse” to the interests of the rank-and-
file members, Levy still prioritizes the leaders’ interests because they
pay his bills.54
A. Levy and Avon: Defending the Ringleader
When Levy represents the organization’s leaders, he zealously ad-
vocates on their behalf. Throughout his representation of Avon Barks-
dale—the head of the Barksdale organization—Levy scrupulously ad-
heres to the duty of zealous representation. Levy’s advocacy on behalf
of Avon occurs behind the scenes in the form of negotiation with other
players in the system. In this respect, The Wire’s portrayal of Levy de-
parts from caricature and reflects a reality of criminal defense practice
rarely portrayed in the media: many battles are won through negotia-
tion rather than courtroom showmanship.
In the last episode of Season One, Levy negotiates with the prose-
cutors to secure a favorable plea agreement for Avon.55 The prosecutors
demand that Avon’s guilty plea result in a lengthy prison sentence, but
Levy pushes back forcefully.56 He initially asks the prosecutors to agree
to a plea to attempted possession of drugs and a very low sentence of
three to four years.57 Faced with a difficult case and steep odds, Levy is
unable to convince the state to accept such a lenient sentence for Avon.58
51 Id. at 160.
52 Id. at 163.
53 SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM BAR ASS’N 2013).
54 See, e.g., id. at r. 1.7(a)(1).
55 The Wire: Sentencing (HBO television broadcast Sept. 8, 2002) (Season One, Episode Thir-
teen).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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However, through his dedicated representation, Levy ultimately se-
cures an extremely short agreed sentence of seven years for a single
count of possession with intent to distribute one kilo of heroin.59 During
this deft negotiation, Levy notes that the government only has circum-
stantial evidence against Avon and warns that a Baltimore jury is un-
likely to convict Avon based on “half-heard, half-said telephone conver-
sations.”60
By negotiating the seven-year agreed plea deal, Levy avoids the far
more extensive drug, gun, conspiracy, and even murder charges that
could have been brought based on Avon’s role in the Barksdale organi-
zation. As the prosecutors say, “We’ve got seized money and a lot of dope
on the table,” “and a lot of violence.”61 The plea Levy negotiates also
avoids a contested sentencing hearing where a judge assessing all of the
evidence might decide to send Avon to prison for far longer. Admittedly,
Levy secures this remarkably lenient sentence in part by selling out
lower-ranking members of the Barksdale organization,62 but he also en-
gages in a fair share of zealous and legitimate advocacy in the process.
Like any good criminal defense lawyer, Levy does not simply accept
Avon’s seven-year sentence. Instead, as Season Two begins, Levy con-
tinues to fight zealously for an early release.63 Avon has begun serving
his prison sentence, so the matter is out of the hands of the prosecu-
tors.64 Levy therefore proceeds to negotiate with officials from the De-
partment of Corrections, who are the relevant decision makers at this
stage of the process.65 Although Avon is not due to be considered for
parole until he is two years into his sentence, Levy drives a hard bar-
gain and negotiates an early parole hearing for him, pledging that in
exchange, Avon will provide information about drug smuggling within
the prison.66 The deal pays off: in Season Three, Avon receives his early
parole hearing.67 Thanks to Levy’s shrewd representation, Avon is re-
leased after serving just one year of his seven-year sentence.68
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See infra Part II.C.
63 The Wire: Hard Cases (HBO television broadcast June 22, 2003) (Season Two, Episode
Four).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 The Wire: Hamsterdam (HBO television broadcast Oct. 10, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Four).
68 Id.
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None of this is meant to imply that Levy’s representation of Avon
is free of ethical problems. Indeed, it is no accident that Avon could pro-
vide information about the corrections officer responsible for smuggling
a batch of tainted drugs into the prison because Avon was responsible
for supplying the officer with the drugs in the first place.69 When Levy
suggests that officials should search the officer’s vehicle to find the
drugs,70 it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Levy knew of Avon’s in-
volvement and still helped his client dupe the Department of Correc-
tions into granting an early release. Levy does everything he can to keep
one of his most lucrative clients happy, pursuing every possible path to
secure Avon’s freedom, without regard to ethical boundaries.
B. Levy and Bodie: Protecting Loyal Members
Levy also litigates to the hilt on behalf of individual members of the
Barksdale organization whose interests align with those of the organi-
zation. This is evident from his representation of Bodie, a young street-
level drug dealer. When Bodie is arrested after assaulting a police of-
ficer and escaping from a juvenile detention facility,71 Levy advocates
for his release at a bond hearing.72
As a technical matter, Levy’s bond argument for Bodie exemplifies
top-notch advocacy: he provides mitigating evidence regarding Bodie’s
offense (escape) and discusses the particular personal circumstances
that render Bodie a good prospect for pretrial release.73 Levy portrays
Bodie as the victim of a vicious police beating who left detention while
heavily medicated and unsure of his surroundings.74 Levy acknowl-
edges his client’s checkered past, but specifically notes that his young
client was “manipulated by older traffickers in his neighborhood.”75
Levy and his associate back up their request for release with documen-
tation aimed at demonstrating that Bodie is a good candidate for bond,
including “signed statements from [Bodie’s] sponsors at the Police Ath-
letic League” and evidence “which indicates that he is enrolled in the
GED program at the Baltimore City Community College.”76 When the
judge relents and announces that he will place Bodie on electronic home
monitoring at his grandmother’s house, Levy objects on the ground that
69 TheWire: Hot Shots (HBO television broadcast June 15, 2003) (Season Two, Episode Three).
70 The Wire: Hard Cases , supra note 63 (Season Two, Episode Four).
71 The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002) (Season One, Episode Four).
72 The Wire: The Wire (HBO television broadcast July 7, 2002) (Season One, Episode Six).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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the grandmother does not have a phone because she’s “on a fixed in-
come, Your Honor.”77 In response, the judge reduces the conditions of
release still further, suggesting that Bodie simply call his probation of-
ficer twice a week.78 In the end, Levy’s advocacy keeps Bodie out of ju-
venile detention and off electronic surveillance.79
Levy’s adherence to his duty of zealous representation, however, is
marred by his violation of his duty of candor to the tribunal.80 The facts
that Levy spins so persuasively are actually a web of lies and half-
truths. Levy even lies about the nature of his representation and his
own financial interest in the case. Levy pretends that he is providing
pro bono representation for at-risk youth when, in fact, he has been re-
tained by the Barksdale organization and is ensuring that Bodie can
return to working for them.81
C. Levy, D’Angelo, and Orlando: Taking Care of Enemies
There is a stark contrast between the vigorous advocacy Levy pro-
vides to Avon and Bodie, and the way Levy treats rank-and-file mem-
bers whose interests diverge from those of the organization. This dis-
tinction is highlighted by Levy’s representation of Avon’s nephew—
D’Angelo—over the course of Season One. At the beginning of the sea-
son, D’Angelo’s interests are aligned with those of the organization and
Levy represents him zealously. As the season progresses, however,
D’Angelo’s interests diverge from the organization’s, and he recognizes
that Levy’s allegiance is to the leaders, not to him. At that point, a pub-
lic defender steps in to represent D’Angelo and offers him uncompro-
mised and unconflicted representation, creating a stark contrast with
Levy’s self-interested approach to lawyering.82
As the series opens, Levy is zealously defending D’Angelo on a mur-
der charge. Levy cross-examines a state’s witness, casting doubt on the
veracity of that witness’s identification.83 D’Angelo is ultimately acquit-
ted because one of the witnesses against him recants at the last minute
due to pressure from the Barksdale organization.84 Later, when police
interrogate D’Angelo about the death of a different witness who testi-
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM BAR ASS’N 2013).
81 The Wire: The Wire, supra note 72 (Season One, Episode Six).
82 The Wire: Sentencing, supra note 55 (Season One, Episode Thirteen).
83 The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season One, Episode One).
84 Id.
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fied against him in that murder case, Levy continues to represent D’An-
gelo in an effective, if not kind or sensitive, manner.85 Levy advises
D’Angelo not to answer any questions and demands his release in the
absence of probable cause.86
But in the penultimate episode of the season, D’Angelo angrily fires
Levy despite the disapproval of Avon’s right hand man, Stringer Bell.87
The firing is prompted by D’Angelo’s concern for his friendWallace, who
D’Angelo suspects (and he is right) was killed by the organization.88
D’Angelo says: “I don’t want this Payless-wearing motherfucker repre-
senting me. Ima get my own man. Alright. So just get back in your car
and get the fuck back down south.”89
In the very next episode, Levy demonstrates his approach toward
those who could undermine the organization. When Stringer mentions
that the organization needs to post bond for its rank-and-file members
to avoid making “enemies,” Levy immediately brings up D’Angelo:
“Speaking of which, where are you with your nephew? Is he gonna see
the light or what?”90 Avon responds by assuring Levy that D’Angelo is
not going to cooperate against the organization: “He family. Aight? He
not gonna bark.”91 But Levy’s implication could not be clearer. Levy sees
anyone who can harm the Barksdale organization—even one of his own
clients—as an enemy. It is hard to imagine a situation more likely to
create conflicts of interest for a criminal defense attorney.
Later in that same episode, we learn that D’Angelo has chosen to
be represented by a public defender rather than Levy.92 The public de-
fender takes a dramatically different approach to the representation of
D’Angelo. She immediately recognizes that, in fact, the best thing D’An-
gelo can do for himself is to cooperate against the organization, and she
zealously advocates for his individual interests even though they are
diametrically opposed to those of the organization.93 The public de-
fender offers D’Angelo the same kind of zealous advocacy Levy always
offers to loyal members of the organization. The public defender’s rep-
resentation of D’Angelo reminds us that zealous advocacy could be
available to everyone in the Barksdale organization.
85 The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 9, 2002) (Season One, Episode Two).
86 Id.
87 The Wire: Cleaning Up, supra note 3 (Season One, Episode Twelve).
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The public defender’s only scene in the series arises when she takes
D’Angelo in for a proffer session with the prosecutors.94 This sort of
meeting involves a defendant providing information about other crimi-
nal activity in the hopes of obtaining a more lenient plea bargain. Dur-
ing the course of this session, the public defender insists on getting a
favorable deal for D’Angelo and ensures that the prosecutors give D’An-
gelo the promise of what is known as proffer protection, which prevents
prosecutors from relying on statements made during a proffer at a later
trial or sentencing.95 The public defender says: “But again, I want to
make it clear that all of this cooperation is contingent on a commitment
that my client finds acceptable. Failing that, everything said in here
stays in here.”96
The public defender is a clear contrast to Levy—she is compassion-
ate, respectful, and appears genuinely concerned about D’Angelo’s best
interests. It is notable that she stands by D’Angelo’s decision to cooper-
ate against the Barksdale organization. Cooperation against the organ-
ization is something that Avon, Stringer, and Levy do everything in
their power to prevent. For example, in the opening scene of the series,
the viewer sees security guard Nakeesha Lyles change her story on the
stand and refuse to identify D’Angelo in his murder trial.97 Stringer
watches Lyles testify in court, and his demeanor makes clear that he is
behind the change in her testimony.98 By convincing Lyles, originally a
cooperating state’s witness, to change her story, the organization neu-
tralizes her otherwise damning testimony. As a result, D’Angelo is ac-
quitted.99 (As noted earlier, Levy continues to consider Lyles a threat
and she is ultimately killed.)
While there are arguments to be made about whether cooperation
would be in D’Angelo’s best interests given the brutality of the Barks-
dale organization, Levy never even presents this option to D’Angelo (or
any other client). In fact, Levy does the opposite, making clear to D’An-
gelo at the time of his arrest that cooperation with the State’s Attorney
will not be tolerated.100 When Levy and Stringer first visit D’Angelo at
the jail, D’Angelo asks who is going to take the fall for the drugs. Levy
responds, “Kid, you better think.”101 As D’Angelo changes over the
course of the season from a loyal soldier into a risky weak link in the
94 Id.
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97 The Wire: The Target, supra note 83 (Season One, Episode One).
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Barksdale organization, Levy also changes from a zealous advocate into
an enforcer who puts the organization’s interests ahead of D’Angelo’s.
But with the public defender supporting him, D’Angelo sees that
cooperation might just be the path to a different life. When Detective
JimmyMcNulty tells him at the end of the proffer session that he’s done
well, D’Angelo responds:
Y’all don’t understand, man. Y’all don’t get it. You grow up in
this shit . . . . All my people man, my father, my uncles, my cous-
ins, it’s just what we do. You just live this shit until you can’t
breathe no more. . . . I was freer in jail than I was at home. . . . I
want to start over. That’s what I want. I don’t care where. Any-
where. I don’t give a fuck. I just want to go somewhere where I
can breathe like regular folk. You give me that and I’ll give you
them.102
Cooperation offers D’Angelo the chance to break free—free of the “shit,”
free of the Barksdale “family,” free of “the Game.” He’s so trapped by
the organization that even jail feels liberating. He’s willing to give up
the organization—both literally and figuratively—in exchange for that
freedom: “You give me that and I’ll give you them.”103
But the pull of the Barksdale organization and its lawyer is just too
strong. Towards the end of the episode, we learn through a riveting,
almost entirely visual sequence that Levy is once again representing
D’Angelo.104 Levy takes a phone call in the jail and the camera pans to
show us, through bars, a defeated shot of D’Angelo.105 His head is in his
hands, and his mother, Brianna, is looking towards Levy.106 Brianna is
Avon’s sister; she is in deep with the Barksdale organization’s leaders.
She is pressing down on D’Angelo’s shoulders in a way that does not
look at all supportive, but is instead a physical depiction of the pressure
the organization has placed on D’Angelo.107 This scene strongly sug-
gests that the organization has essentially forced D’Angelo to accept
Levy back as his lawyer.
102 The Wire: Sentencing, supra note 55 (Season One, Episode Thirteen).
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In the final minutes of Season One, Levy sacrifices D’Angelo’s lib-
erty. In this courtroom scene, D’Angelo pleads guilty.108 From the pros-
ecutor’s allocution during the guilty plea proceeding, it becomes clear
that D’Angelo is taking the fall for the very conduct Levy avoided hav-
ing pinned on Avon, the real leader. The prosecutor speaks of D’Angelo
as a “leading conspirator”who supervised drug distribution activity and
was “integrally involved in the violence attributed to the organiza-
tion.”109
In addition, although the plea appears to be structured in a way
that would allow Levy to request less time than twenty years without
hurting the organization as a whole, Levy never tries to bargain over
D’Angelo’s sentence as he did with Avon’s sentence.110 In fact, Levy does
not advocate for D’Angelo at all. The prosecutor asks the judge to sen-
tence D’Angelo to twenty years in prison, Levy remains silent, and the
judge sentences D’Angelo to twenty years.111 When a client is facing a
twenty-year maximum and no mandatory minimum sentence, the law-
yer is ethically bound to appeal to the judge’s discretion by presenting
the equities and mitigating factors that weigh in favor of a sentence
below the maximum. While a public defender—or any lawyer whose al-
legiances are not divided—would endeavor to adhere to this ethical
duty, Levy shirks it. He has no incentive to secure D’Angelo a lower
sentence and probably believes that the organization as a whole would
be safer with D’Angelo behind bars.
108 Id.
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In this scene, it is clear that Levy does not see D’Angelo as worthy
of the same zealous representation he provides to loyal members of the
Barksdale organization, and perhaps does not see D’Angelo as a client
at all. Once D’Angelo reveals his disloyalty and shows that he is willing
to risk the organization to save himself, Levy treats him as a bargaining
chip to preserve the future of the organization that pays his bills and
that, to his mind, is his only true client. If D’Angelo had continued being
represented by the public defender and cooperating, there is no doubt
that he would have secured a much lower sentence in light of how much
he knew about the inner-workings of the Barksdale organization. In-
stead, he goes to prison and ultimately pays for his brief disloyalty with
his life. The organization kills D’Angelo in prison, making it look like a
suicide.112
After D’Angelo’s death, we learn the full story of why D’Angelo gave
up his public defender and returned to Levy—decisions that led to both
his incarceration and his murder. As the earlier scene in the prison had
suggested, D’Angelo’s mother—Brianna—pressured him to change
course.113 This comes out when Brianna hears a rumor that McNulty
believes D’Angelo did not commit suicide, but was instead murdered at
the behest of the organization’s leaders.114 Brianna seeks out McNulty
and is in disbelief at his suspicion that her own brother, Avon, might
have ordered her son’s murder: “Avon and D was family,” she says.115
McNulty scoffs, “Family, right.”116 He knows that in this “family,”
money is thicker than blood. McNulty also tells Brianna that he knows
she is responsible for convincing D’Angelo not to follow through with
cooperating against the organization: “At the end, D’Angelo was this
close to flippin’, givin’ up everybody, everything. But you know all that,
right? You were the one who went down to that detention center and
talked your son out of a deal.”117 When Brianna asks why McNulty
didn’t come to her with his suspicions about her son’s murder, he re-
sponds harshly: “Honestly? I was lookin’ for somebody who cared about
the kid. I mean, like I said, you were the one that made him take the
years, right?”118 Brianna begins to cry as it dawns on her that she may
have sacrificed her son to protect the organization.119
112 The Wire: All Prologue, supra note 1 (Season Two, Episode Six).
113 The Wire: Sentencing, supra note 55 (Season One, Episode Thirteen).
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D’Angelo is not the only person Levy sacrifices in the name of the
organization—the organization and Levy will sacrifice anyone who puts
them at risk. Orlando, the owner of a club that the organization used to
hide and launder money, finds himself on the losing end of this kind of
sacrifice after he is arrested for trying to buy cocaine from an under-
cover officer.120 When Levy meets with Orlando in jail, Orlando expects
Levy will act in his interest and post bail on behalf of the Barksdale
crew. Instead, Levy orders Orlando to sign paperwork transferring own-
ership of the club and the club’s liquor license.121 When Orlando objects,
Levy makes it clear that he represents the Barksdale organization, not
Orlando.122 He says: “A front has to be clean, and right now, you ain’t
that. Sign.”123 Levy’s actions are driven by the needs of the organization.
When Orlando’s arrest jeopardizes those interests, Levy protects the
organization and leaves Orlando to fend for himself.
In addition to neglecting the needs of individual clients whose in-
terests diverge from those of the Barksdale organization, Levy actively
collaborates with the organization’s leaders to maximize the benefits of
selling out his other clients. During the final episode of Season One, he
tells Avon and Stringer: “I want you to start thinking about who was
charged and what kind of time they can do. One of the ways to limit
your exposure is what’s called a structured plea. That means that you’re
gonna have to deliver your people, all of ‘em, down to a man.”124 In this
scene, Levy abdicates all responsibility for his rank-and-file clients, in-
stead handing over the decision about their fates to the organization’s
leaders. He gives the leaders the power to save themselves and “limit”
their own “exposure” by deciding the length of his other clients’ sen-
tences. This is perhaps the most egregious example of Levy repudiating
his duty of loyalty to his rank-and-file clients.
III. LEVY’S REPRESENTATION OF THEMARLO STANFIELD
ORGANIZATION: MORE CONTRADICTIONS AND CARICATURE
Throughout the early seasons of The Wire, Levy’s representation
revolves around the Barksdale organization and its major players. That
changes when the Barksdale organization crumbles at the end of Sea-
son Three. Avon is in prison, Stringer is dead, and there’s a new drug
king in town: Marlo Stanfield.125 The Wire portrays Marlo as a more
120 The Wire: The Cost (HBO television broadcast Aug. 11, 2002) (Season One, Episode Ten).
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125 The Wire: Mission Accomplished (HBO television broadcast Dec. 19, 2004) (Season Three,
Episode Twelve).
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vicious and violent Avon who will stop at nothing to solidify his power.
Marlo’s number two is Chris Partlow, who is himself a more vicious and
violent version of Avon’s number two, Stringer.
Viewers are introduced to Marlo for the first time at the beginning
of Season Three. Bubbles and Johnny, two down-on-their luck addicts,
are wheeling an old shopping cart full of scrap metal down the street
when they lose control of the cart and it runs into a black SUV.126 Sev-
eral young men come out of a nearby home and start yelling at Bubbles
and Johnny.127 One of the men puts a gun to Johnny’s head.128 Hearing
the commotion, Marlo comes to the door and asks what’s happening.129
The man replies, “Look what they did to my ride!”130 Marlo responds
matter-of-factly: “Do it or don’t, but I’ve got someplace to be.”131 This
scene is quintessential Marlo: cold, unemotional, and savage. He
doesn’t care whether his guy kills Johnny or not; he’s focused on his own
plans.
Marlo and his organization become Levy’s most important clients
in Season Five. Through the lens of Levy’s representation of the Stan-
field organization, we see additional examples of the contradictions he
presents: his unethical, illegal conduct on the one hand, and his zealous
lawyering on the other. Like before, Levy is willing to sell out anyone
below Marlo to further his own goals, and he does it in a way that is not
only unethical, but criminal. At the same time, Levy continues to show
deep loyalty and zealousness to the head of the organization who pays
his bills—Marlo—as well as to the people whose interests are aligned
with Marlo’s interests.
The first example of Levy’s unethical and criminal behavior in his
representation of the Stanfield organization comes when Levy meets
with Marlo, Chris, and Snoop, who is a high-ranking member of the
Stanfield organization, to discuss the organization’s business.132 The
three are concerned about Chris and Snoop’s arrest, where officers
found guns in a secret compartment of the car they were driving.133
Chris and Snoop make clear to Levy that they can’t do prison time and
neither can the car’s owner.134 Levy responds that they should “get
126 The Wire: Time After Time (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19, 2004) (Season Three, Epi-
sode One).
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someone who can [do time], preferably someone without priors, some-
one you trust to stand the charge.”135 Levy’s response is nonchalant.
This is standard operating procedure for him and he knows that this
approach—finding a scapegoat to protect those at the top of the drug
trafficking organization—will win him Marlo’s future business.
Levy works to keep Marlo happy by directing O-Dog—the organi-
zation’s fall guy for Chris and Snoop—to commit perjury and say that
the gun was his. Snoop brings O-Dog to Levy’s office and Levy tells him
what he needs to do. O-Dog responds, “[W]hatever guns them cops took
out the truck last year, they mine, even though I ain’t touch that
iron.”136 O-Dog thus assures Levy that he will falsely admit to owning
the seized guns, although, in truth, the guns did not belong to him and
he never even touched them. Levy nevertheless barrels forward, un-
fazed by this claim of innocence. It’s all business to him. In preparation
for O-Dog’s guilty plea hearing, Levy instructs him to “[f]amiliarize
yourself with the make and model of the weapons you left in the truck,
Mr. Hill. The details matter.”137
Of course, Levy’s conduct is illegal and a clear violation of several
ethical rules. He knows that O-Dog is going to commit perjury by falsely
claiming the guns are his. Levy knows this not only from O-Dog’s own
statements, but from how Chris and Snoop tell him that they can’t do
the time and neither can the registered owner of the car. In addition,
any competent, ethical attorney would know that Levy’s representation
of Marlo, Chris, Snoop, and O-Dog presents an untenable conflict. But
Levy wants to satisfy Marlo, who pays his bills. Marlo doesn’t want
Chris and Snoop to go to jail. So O-Dog, a low-level crew member, is
forced to take the fall, even though all signs point to him being inno-
cent.138 At no point does Levy seek a conflict waiver in which any of
these individuals accept the concurrent conflicts of interest, as the eth-
ics rules require.139 Instead, Levy ensures Marlo’s continued business
by representing everyone without advising clients like O-Dog of their
right to conflict-free representation, unmoved by the fact that the joint
representation tramples O-Dog’s individual interests.
After Levy makes the unethical and criminal suggestion that Marlo
and his crew find someone to commit perjury and take the fall for Chris
and Snoop, Marlo leaves Levy with a check and something even more
135 Id.
136 The Wire: Late Editions (HBO television broadcast Mar. 2, 2008) (Season Five, Episode
Nine).
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valuable to Levy—Marlo’s phone number.140 Levy knows this means
business for his firm. Levy tells Herc, a disgraced former Baltimore po-
lice officer whom Levy hires as a private investigator, “I have a feeling
this firm is going to have quite a payday from Mr. Stanfield and his
people. He just gave me his phone number. If Marlo Stanfield is using
a cell phone, it’s just a matter of time before we are up to our asses in
pretrial motions, litigating a wiretap case.”141
The second example of Levy’s unethical and criminal behavior on
behalf of the Stanfield organization occurs when Marlo and his crew are
arrested for various drug-related offenses at the end of the series. Levy’s
loyalty to Marlo and those at the top of Marlo’s organization pays off
when Levy is called on to represent them.142 With the bust, Levy has
numerous clients to represent simultaneously: Cheese and Monk (two
higher-level players in the Stanfield organization), Chris, and, of
course, Marlo.143 The four are arrested and taken to jail.144 Levy repre-
sents all of them at their first appearance and is only able to negotiate
for Cheese to be released on bond, in spite of Marlo’s pleas for Levy to
find a way to bond him out as well.145
Levy demonstrates his diligence and zeal by piecing together some-
thing the viewer already knows—that the bust of the Stanfield organi-
zation is a result of an illegal wiretap by the Baltimore Police Depart-
ment. Levy first realizes that something is wrong when he talks to
Marlo about how he is unlikely to be released on bond because “the
charging papers portray [Marlo] at the top of the conspiracy.”146 Levy
tells Marlo, “the full affidavit says they developed a source of infor-
mation, a source of information who told them that you communicated
with each other using photographic transmissions on cell phones, coded
transmission.”147 Marlo tells Levy that is impossible because “ain’t no-
body know about the code except me, Chris, Monk, and Cheese, and we
all locked up behind this.”148 Unprompted by Levy, Herc goes to Detec-
tive Carver and asks about the Stanfield bust. Herc suspects that it is
a wiretap because he previously gave Carver Marlo’s number from
Levy’s rolodex.149 Herc says to Carver knowingly, “It was a wiretap,
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right?”; Carver demurs.150 Later, in the office, Herc shares with Levy
what he learned about a possible wiretap.151 He explains that he’s hear-
ing on the record that “the only [overtime] is people who are detailed on
the homeless killings,”152 but off the record, he’s “hearing that maybe
it’s a wire.”153With this new information, Levy is increasingly convinced
that it must have been a wiretap.154 He says to Herc, “So no one is mak-
ing any money, but there’s no wiretap?”155
In the final episode of the series, Levy probes his suspicions that
the wiretap was illegal and concludes it was. He visits Marlo at the jail
and asks him again about who knew the code on his phone.156 Marlo
insists, as he had before, that no one else knew about it other than the
people from his organization who were also in jail with him.157 Marlo
then tells Levy that no one else had his cell phone number except
Levy.158 Levy thinks about this and looks genuinely perplexed.159 He
tells Marlo that only a wiretap would explain the speed at which the
police broke the code.160
Levy knows that he has just uncovered very important leverage for
his clients. He conveys that information to prosecutor Rhonda Pearl-
man in the courthouse: “They grabbed the phones and minutes later
they’ve cracked an elaborate code that implicates everyone. No one’s
that brilliant, not in the BPD anyway.”161 He goes on to tell her: “[I]f
you wait until this goes past indictments, I’m gonna run wild with it.”162
This is quintessential zealous Levy, using his leverage to try to secure
a favorable result for his clients. From past experience, Pearlman
knows Levy is a skilled enough attorney to effectively litigate against
the illegal wiretap in court.163 As Levy puts together the pieces about
the wiretap, Pearlman does the same thing and discovers a new side to
Levy’s illegal conduct: he’s been buying confidential court documents
150 The Wire: Late Editions, supra note 136 (Season Five, Episode Nine).
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from a grand jury prosecutor.164 Lester Freamon, a Baltimore Police De-
partment detective who works closely with McNulty, tells Pearlman
that he will get Levy on tape admitting to the illegal conduct as a way
to atone for his own involvement with the illegal wiretap.165
In addition to learning about Levy illegally obtaining confidential
documents, the final episode provides more examples of Levy as the car-
icatured, unethical criminal defense lawyer. After Pearlman learns
about the grand jury documents, she confronts Levy and blackmails
him for a deal.166 She makes her terms clear: she does not want the
illegal wiretap to be made public and she wants Marlo’s crew to go to
prison.167 They strike a deal that elevates Pearlman to a judgeship,
saves Levy from a criminal indictment, and astonishingly keeps Marlo
out of prison entirely.168 Others are not so fortunate. Chris is forced to
be the fall guy, pleading guilty to several murders and agreeing to life
without the possibility of parole.169 Cheese and Monk plead guilty to the
drug charges, and face up to 20 years.170 Chris’ sentence in particular
shows that even the most important members of the Stanfield organi-
zation will be sacrificed by Levy when their interests diverge from those
of Marlo and the organization as a whole.
From a legal standpoint, the viewer is left to wonder what would
have happened if Levy did not negotiate the case under the prosecutor’s
threat to expose his own criminal conduct. Chris, Cheese, and Monk
would very likely have been better off if Levy (or another attorney with-
out conflicts) had exposed the illegal wiretap in court. Chris, for exam-
ple, could not have done any worse if Levy had litigated the issues in
his case.171 With all three, fighting the wiretap issue alone had the po-
tential of winning dismissal, or at least significantly lower sentences.
But here, as with the Barksdale organization, the man who pays the
bills is the person who benefits the most from Levy’s representation.
Levy’s ethical and moral decline is on full display as he gloats over
the result to Herc and is jubilant about what it will mean for his busi-
ness: “[N]ow, if Marlo takes the deal, he’s gonna get a walk after being
charged in a multimillion-dollar drug seizure. That doesn’t happen very
often, and when it does happen, the name and number of the defense
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 While the death penalty inMaryland was not officially abolished until 2013, only five people
were executed in the previous four decades. See Maryland, DEATHPENALTY INFORMATIONCENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/maryland-1 [https://perma.cc/8FA4-8DH4].
232 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2018
attorney goes in the front pocket of every respectable drug trafficker.”172
The Stanfield organization is ostensibly in shambles, but Levy knows
that his unethical deal not only has saved him from losing his livelihood
and going to prison, but has also secured him the business of the next
Avon or Marlo.
Although it is beyond the subject of this article, Pearlman’s ethical
decline is notable. Throughout most of the series, Pearlman is portrayed
as a tough, hardworking, and ethical prosecutor who does the right
thing. During her blackmail conversation with Levy, however, he
quickly points out that she is also committing a crime: “You’re black-
mailing an officer of the court. The moment you came in here and of-
fered that quid pro quo, you were guilty of obstruction of justice.”173
Pearlman agrees and says, “You’re right, I could get 6–8 years. And for
bribery of a state’s attorney and the violation of grand jury secrecy, you
could see 10–12.”174 Here, we see a very different Pearlman, one who is
willing to engage in criminality to protect the Baltimore Police Depart-
ment from embarrassment and elevate her own professional stature (in
the final scenes of the final episode of the series, the viewer sees that
Pearlman has become a state court judge).175 At this point, Pearlman is
no better than Levy. Pearlman’s decline embodies a larger takeaway
from The Wire: urban institutions are complex and there are no “good
guys” or “bad guys.” Levy is a complex “bad guy” and Pearlman is a
complex “good guy” who, try as she might, is as vulnerable to the pres-
sures of the system as Levy.
The viewer sees all of the contradictory sides of Levy on display as
he represents the Stanfield organization on the cases relating to this
bust. When he represents low-level dealers like O-Dog (who took the
fall for Chris and Snoop’s arrest for gun possession) to suit the organi-
zation’s needs, the viewer sees the unethical, nefarious attorney who
embraces what should be an obvious conflict of interest. However, in his
representation of the Stanfield organization, Levy reveals himself to be
a zealous and talented attorney who gets good results for clients at the
top of the organization.
172 The Wire: -30-, supra note 7 (Season Five, Episode Ten).
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IV. THE LACK OF PUBLICDEFENDERS IN THEWIRE: A MISSED
OPPORTUNITY
Levy is the representation of criminal defense attorneys in The
Wire. As discussed above, the only time the viewer so much as sees an-
other criminal defense lawyer is after D’Angelo Barksdale fires Levy as
his lawyer and is very briefly represented by a public defender. See Part
II.C, supra. This singular focus on Levy makes it easy for the viewer to
see his unethical behavior and criminal misdeeds as representative of
criminal defense attorneys as a whole. Levy is—perhaps intentionally—
a caricature.
This caricature of criminal defense attorneys is, however, an unfor-
tunate and surprising shortcoming of the show and a missed oppor-
tunity to reflect the reality of criminal defense lawyering more broadly.
The Wire portrays criminal defense attorneys as villainous and nefari-
ous across the board, when in reality Levy’s conduct represents a very
small minority of criminal defense lawyers. There is also no counterbal-
ance to Levy. With one exception, the show does not depict public de-
fenders or other hardworking criminal defense lawyers doing their best
to provide zealous representation to their clients in an ethical and legal
manner. In this respect, The Wire is no better than Law and Order or
similar shows, which often caricature the criminal justice system as
heavily slanted in defendants’ favor and portray “criminals” being set
free on legal technicalities.176
For example, the scene in which Levy shares his excitement with
Herc about getting Marlo’s cell phone number reflects an important dif-
ference between private lawyers like Levy and public defenders—one
that goes unexplored in the series. Unlike private attorneys, public de-
fenders do not have to worry about winning new clients, andmoney does
not cause them ethical trouble. Their only interest is in obtaining the
best outcome for their individual client. Generally speaking, public de-
fenders also would prefer fewer prosecutions; they would prefer to be
out of a job. On the other hand, retained lawyers like Levy are inher-
ently conflicted. They prefer some level of prosecution because without
it, they won’t be paid. At the same time, they need to be successful in
order to retain new business. Levy’s behavior reflects an attempt to tow
that line.
The only depiction of a public defender in the entire series is in the
brief but pivotal scene in which we learn that D’Angelo has fired Levy
and is attempting to cooperate against the Barksdale organization. In
that scene, the public defender not only provides zealous representation
176 See Kimberlianne Podlas, Guilty on All Accounts: Law & Order’s Impact on Public Percep-
tion of Law and Order, 18 SETONHALL J. SPORTS&ENT. L. 1, 34–35 (2008).
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but also serves as a moral compass. The public defender’s detachment
from the overall criminal enterprise also allows her to acknowledge the
Barksdale organization’s brutality in a way that emphasizes her hu-
manity without undermining D’Angelo’s interests. Throughout the
meeting, D’Angelo’s public defender looks troubled with the Barksdale
organization’s activities.177 When a detective pulls out a gruesome pho-
tograph of one of the people the organization has killed, the public de-
fender flinches and says, “God!”178 After spending so long immersed in
the Barksdale organization’s pattern of violence, the public defender’s
honest reaction to this image prevents the viewer from becoming desen-
sitized. As one critic writes, the moment is “an outside reminder of just
how brutal the Barksdale crew is.”179
The near absence of public defenders stands in stark contrast to
The Wire’s complex portraits of actors in nearly every other facet of the
criminal justice system. Considering that public defenders represent as
many as 68% of felony defendants in the United States’ 75 most popu-
lous counties, the show leaves out one of the system’s most ubiquitous
and important actors.180 Recent data from the Baltimore Metro area
shows that public defenders are working under arduous conditions. In
2016, they were assigned to 473 circuit court cases each, on average,
which is more than twice the state’s recommended caseload limit.181
These kinds of crushing caseloads raise serious constitutional concerns
and contribute to mass incarceration. As Jonathan Rapping, a leader in
the field of indigent defense, notes, “[i]f we want lasting criminal justice
reform and a real end to mass incarceration, we must reverse this prac-
tice of ignoring the need for a strongly supported system of public de-
fenders.”182 He continues, “[i]f we truly care about justice and liberty for
every American accused of a crime . . . then we need to stop treating
[the] conversation as though it were an episode of Law & Order. Public
177 The Wire: Sentencing, supra note 55 (Season One, Episode Thirteen).
178 Id.
179 Alan Sepinwall, The Wire, Season 1, Episode 13: “Sentencing” (Veterans edition), WHAT’S
ALAN WATCHING? (Aug. 29, 2008), http://sepinwall.blogspot.com/2008/08/wire-season-1-episode
-13-sentencing_29.html [https://perma.cc/2WXA-L77H].
180 CAROLINEWOLFHARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics ed., 2000).
181 Jesse Coburn, Maryland Public Defenders Juggle Heavy Caseloads; Critics Say Indigent
Clients Suffer, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/mary
land/investigations/bs-md-public-defender-caseloads-20160819-story.html [https://Perma.cc/4LE8
-6NXA].
182 Jonathan Rapping, Public Defenders Key to Reducing Mass Incarceration, TALK POVERTY
(Oct. 28, 2015), https://talkpoverty.org/2015/10/28/public-defenders-key-reducing-mass-incarcera
tion/ [https://perma.cc/FB2X-9QXJ].
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defenders—and how we as a nation support and invest in them—must
be at the center of the reform debate.”183
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Despite the serious and legitimate concerns surrounding conflicts
of interest in criminal cases, the solution remains unclear. As the Su-
preme Court demonstrated inWheat,184 courts remain comfortable with
vigorously policing conflicts of interest in extreme cases, even overrul-
ing a defendant’s waiver of a conflict. Many commentators, though,
have claimed that courts’ skepticism of conflicts and the denial of waiv-
ers do not go far enough.
In response, these commentators primarily recommend two ap-
proaches. The first of these approaches, supported by Professor Kevin
H. Michels, involves a strong, hands-on role for courts. Recognizing the
importance of representing and prioritizing the client’s interests first,
Michels argues that courts should reject a supposed informed consent
waiver if the limitations placed on a lawyer due to a conflict of interest
are “likely to defeat the client’s objectives for the representation.”185
This focus on the client’s objectives reflects the need for loyalty in an
attorney-client relationship. While a lawyer may make certain strategic
decisions in the course of the representation, the client decides on the
desired outcome of that representation. Conflicts of interest pose a prob-
lem to the legal system for exactly this reason: they can make it impos-
sible for a lawyer to appropriately pursue the interests of multiple cli-
ents at once. For this reason, Michels proposes that “[a]n informed
conflict waiver must be rejected as incompetent if limitations on the
means or procedures by which the attorney pursues the matter caused
by the conflict of interest are likely to defeat the client’s objectives for
the representation.”186
The second approach, advocated in a student Note by Ross Barr
and Brian Friedman, leaves the power and responsibility of ensuring
ethical representation to the attorneys themselves rather than in the
hands of the courts. According to this school of thought, attorneys
should “decline to act for more than one of several codefendants except
in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear either
that no conflict is likely to develop . . . or that common representation
will be advantageous to each of the codefendants represented . . . .”187
183 Id.
184 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
185 Kevin H. Michels,What Conflicts Can Be Waived? A Unified Understanding of Competence
and Consent, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 109, 136 (2012).
186 Id. at 138.
187 Ross Barr and Brian Friedman, Note, Joint Representation of Criminal Codefendants: A
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This solution involves caution and conscientiousness on the part of at-
torneys themselves.
When considering these current approaches to conflicts of interest,
it is also important to note that lawyers who knowingly engage in con-
flicted representation are the exception rather than the rule. The prob-
lem discussed inWood188—a lawyer representing both a criminal enter-
prise and its individual members—is rarer still, despite occasional
attempts to present the “mob lawyer” as an existential threat to the
criminal defense bar.189 In general, the corrupt defense lawyer is more
pop culture caricature than real-life phenomenon. On the other hand,
strict rules limiting the behavior of criminal defense lawyers present a
serious risk of abuse by courts and prosecutors.190 Any solution to con-
flicts of interest must take these two factors into account, taking care
to prevent the scope of any solution from exceeding the scope of the
problem to which it is addressed.
The solution that best protects clients’ interests in the rare situa-
tion when a criminal defense lawyer seeks to engage in multiple repre-
sentations is for judges to appoint an attorney to advise the client when
there is a high likelihood of a potential conflict. This approach comes
down between the two approaches discussed above and accounts for the
shortcomings in both the competence test proposed by Michels and the
attorney-driven, largely toothless approach advocated by Barr and
Friedman. This approach is also a common practice in federal court,
where judges appoint independent “conflict counsel” when multiple cli-
ents are being represented by the same lawyer.191 The job of conflict
counsel is to discuss the potential conflict with the client, ensure that
the client understands the potential problems and risks, and determine
whether the client nevertheless wishes to waive the conflict. If judges
are more proactive about appointing conflict counsel when there is a
high likelihood of a potential conflict as a result of multi-client repre-
sentation by the same lawyer, this will solve some of the problems with
Proposal to Breathe Life into Section 4-3.5(c) of the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration
of Criminal Justice, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 635, 637 (2002) (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Standard 4-3.5(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 1992)).
188 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
189 SeeMorgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys’ Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory
to Define Individual Rights, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (describing how the President’s Commis-
sion on Organized Crime “attempted to use Justice Department data concerning federal prosecu-
tions of attorneys to support its theory of the ‘mob lawyer’ as a widespread problem, but were
unable, at that time, to develop a reliable statistical base of information.”).
190 Id. at 6 (noting in the context of asset forfeiture that “one need not accept the jeremiads of
forfeiture opponents to recognize that allowing the government to seize defense attorneys’ earned
compensation affects the ability of defendants to obtain legal representation, and perhaps the
quality of that representation as well”).
191 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Resolving Client Conflicts by Hiring “Conflicts Counsel”, 62 Has-
tings L.J. 677 (2011).
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the representation provided by lawyers like Levy. This solution is also
preferable to excessively aggressive solutions like that proposed by Mi-
chels because it does not risk compromising the client’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.
